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A PROMISE UNFULFILLED: CHALLENGES TO
GEORGIA’S DEATH PENALTY STATUTE POSTFURMAN
William Cody Newsome
INTRODUCTION
William Henry Furman was twenty-nine years old when he was
convicted for the murder of William Joseph Micke, Jr., on September
20, 1968.1 After a trial lasting a single day, the jury returned a guilty
verdict along with a death sentence.2 The only evidence presented to
the jury was a conflicting account of the events,3 and Furman’s age
and race.4 On appeal, Furman’s counsel argued Georgia law created
an arbitrary death penalty because it failed to distinguish the present
crime “from thousands of others for which the death penalty is not
inflicted.”5
In Furman v. Georgia, 6 the U.S. Supreme Court agreed with
Furman’s counsel. 7 Three Justices agreed that Georgia law, as
applied, was arbitrary and potentially discriminatory.8 Moreover, one


J.D. Candidate, 2017, Georgia State University College of Law. I would like to thank every member of
the GSU Law Review for their time and effort spent editing this Note. In life, we are lucky to have one
person on which we can truly depend, but God has blessed me with a large and loving family. To my
family: I wish I could thank you in the manner you deserve, but I can’t. All I can say is that I will be
eternally grateful to Him and to you for pushing me to be a better man and giving me a model to live by.
1. Brief for Petitioner at 2–3, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (No. 71-5003).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 5–6. A detective, who questioned Furman after the arrest, testified that Furman said he
fired a shot as he was fleeing the house. Id. Furman denied making this statement. Id. Instead, Furman
claimed the gun accidentally discharged when he tripped as he fled from the house. Id.
4. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 12. The jury was not given information on Furman’s mental
capacity. Id. Only weeks after the alleged murder, Furman was institutionalized at the Georgia Central
State Hospital in Milledgeville, Georgia. Id. at 9. Months before the trial, the Superintendent of the
Hospital reported mental deficiency with psychotic episodes that would inhibit his ability to assist his
defense counsel at trial. Id. Moreover, evidence that Furman had only earned a sixth grade level of
education was also not admitted. Id. at 10 n. 9.
5. Brief for Petitioner supra note 1, at 11–12.
6. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
7. Id. at 256–57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310 (White, J.,
concurring).
8. Furman, 408 U.S. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[W]e know that the discretion of judges and
juries in imposing the death penalty enables the penalty to be selectively applied . . .”); id. at 309
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Justice challenged the value of the death penalty and doubted it
served any of the alleged purposes for which it was employed.9 The
challenges of five Justices in Furman opened the floodgates for
additional legal challenges to the death penalty.
Since Furman, the Court has ruled on various legal procedures
involved in the process of execution.10 Each challenge illustrates the
Court’s evolving understanding of “cruel and unusual punishment,”11
and what that means for the viability of the death penalty in America.
With each new standard the Court imposes, the marginal benefits of
imposing the death penalty are diminished. 12 Faced with the
challenges of imposing the death penalty, nineteen states and the

(Stewart, J., concurring) (“In the first place, it is clear that these sentences are ‘cruel’ in the sense that
they excessively go beyond, not in degree but in kind, the punishments that the state legislatures have
determined to be necessary. In the second place, it is equally clear that these sentences are ‘unusual’ in
the sense that the penalty of death is infrequently imposed for murder . . . . These death sentences are
cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.” (citations
omitted)); id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) (“I can do no more than state a conclusion based on 10 years
of almost daily exposure to the facts and circumstances of hundreds and hundreds of federal and state
criminal cases involving crimes for which death is the authorized penalty. That conclusion . . . is that the
death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes and that there is no
meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it
is not.”).
9. Furman, 408 U.S. at 342–58 (Marshall, J., concurring); see infra note 66 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008) (holding a statute unconstitutional that
authorized the death penalty for aggravated rape of a child without a resulting death); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (“The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the
death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed.”); Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (holding “a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury,” violates the
sixth amendment when the judge finds the “aggravating circumstances necessary for imposition of the
death penalty”); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (concluding the eighth amendment does
not preclude the execution of mentally retarded individuals), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 321 (2002) (“Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our ‘evolving
standards of decency,’” the court held the death penalty is excessive for a mentally retarded offender);
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (“[T]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit
the execution of a person who was under 16 years of age at the time of his or her offense.”); McCleskey
v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 29–93 (1987) (holding that a greater number of executions of black-on-white
murderers versus white-on-black murderers does not establish racial discrimination without
“discriminatory purpose”); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (“The Eighth Amendment
prohibits the State from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane.”); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding the death penalty for rape of an adult woman is “grossly
disproportionate and excessive punishment . . . and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as
cruel and unusual punishment”).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
12. Ralph Dellapiana, Should We put the Death Penalty on the Chopping Block?, 22 UTAH BAR J.
24, 24 (2009); see Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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District of Columbia have simply abolished the punishment
altogether.13
Although many challenges subsequent to Furman have been raised
and arguably resolved by the Court, the underlying challenges raised
by Furman appear to remain prevalent with the Court. Justice Breyer
recently echoed the concurring opinions of Furman in his dissenting
opinion from Glossip v. Gross, when he stated: “In this world, or at
least in this Nation, we can have a death penalty that at least arguably
serves legitimate penological purposes or we can have a procedural
system that at least arguably seeks reliability and fairness in the death
penalty’s application. We cannot have both.”14
This Note will explore both sides of Justice Breyer’s contention in
Glossip. Part I will establish a brief history of the death penalty in the
United States and the constitutional limits imposed by the Supreme
Court of the United States. 15 Part I will also discuss Furman v.
Georgia and establish the constitutional principles that result from
that decision.
Part II will analyze Justice Breyer’s contention in Glossip by first
looking to whether contemporary death penalty systems serve a
“penological purpose,” 16 and then whether the systems of
Connecticut17 or Maryland fail to achieve “reliability and fairness in
[their respective] application.” 18 Part II will conclude with an
additional study conducted in Georgia, which reinforces similar
findings in Connecticut and Maryland regarding their respective
issues with the death penalty.19 Finally, Part III will examine whether
Georgia can improve its death penalty system and what steps it
should take to eliminate the issues articulated in Furman.20

13. States with and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO.
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last modified July 1, 2015).
14. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2772 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
15. See discussion infra Part I.B–C.
16. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2772 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see discussion infra Part II.A.
17. See discussion infra Part II.B.
18. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2772 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see discussion infra Part II.C.
19. See discussion infra Part II.D.
20. See discussion infra Part III.
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I. BACKGROUND
The death penalty has developed as a result of general reforms,21
but more importantly through federal interpretations of common and
constitutional law.22
A. Federal Interpretations of Common and Constitutional Law
Due to death penalty system reforms, the punishment was in a
relative state of flux between 1900 and 1960 in the United States.23
However, the Supreme Court attempted to combat that flux by
shaping the developments of modern death penalty laws through the
lens of common law and the Fifth, 24 Eighth, 25 and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution.26
21. Frederick C. Millett, Will the United States Follow England (and the Rest of the World) in
Abandoning Capital Punishment?, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 547, 586–87 (2008). The reforms included:
“(1) the use of more humane methods of execution, (2) the prohibition of public
executions to protect the public from exposure to the death penalty, (3) the
development of ‘degrees’ of murder where only the highest degree of murder
received the death penalty, and (4) the use of jury discretion to choose the death
penalty instead of the mandatory sentence of death.”
Id. These reforms reflected the evolving standards of society, allowing it to remain prevalent in the
United States. Id. at 586.
22. See discussion infra Part I.A.
23. Millett, supra note 21, at 589. Millett noted:
By 1917, twelve states had abolished the death penalty, though ‘under the nervous
tension of World War I, four of those States reinstituted’ it. By the end of World
War II, ‘[t]he manner of inflicting death changed, and the horrors of the
punishment were, therefore, somewhat diminished in the minds of the general
public’ and, as a result, nothing much happened until many decades later.
Between the years 1900 and 1966, an estimated 7226 judicial executions were
carried out in the United States. In addition, by the end of the 1960s, forty-one
states, the District of Columbia, and the federal government all allowed the death
penalty for at least one crime. As late as the 1960s, crimes punishable by the
death penalty in at least two states included the following crimes: murder, treason,
kidnapping, rape, statutory rape, robbery, bombing, assault with a deadly weapon
by a life term prisoner, train wrecking, burglary, arson, perjury in a capital case,
espionage, machine gunning, and other particular forms of assault.
Notwithstanding, the number of executions began to decline: twenty-one in 1963,
fifteen in 1964, seven in 1965, and only three between 1966 and 1967.
Id. at 589–90.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (disallowing the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishment”). The
fluctuating understanding of the death penalty may be demonstrated with two cases. In Wilkerson v.
Utah, the Court upheld public shootings as a permissible form of execution because it was a common
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First, in Weems v. United States, 27 the Court established the
constitutional requirement for proportionality between the crime and
punishment.28 Second, the Court decided Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber,29 where it held that the Constitution prohibited cruelty in
the method of execution, not the suffering as a result of being
sentenced to death.30 Third, in Trop v. Dulles,31 the Court stated that
its understanding of cruel and unusual punishment develops along
with society.32 Trop was pivotal in that it established a standard of
“decency . . . of a maturing society,”33 opening the door for the Court
to eventually rule the process unconstitutional altogether. These cases
largely guided the Court in death penalty cases like Furman and
beyond.
B. Pre-Furman to Post-Furman
Following Trop, six characteristics of the death penalty bearing
constitutional significance became evident across numerous death

method used for “soldiers convicted of desertion or other capital military offences . . . .” 99 U.S. 130,
135 (1878). “Wilkerson seemed to suggest that a severe punishment is not cruel and unusual if it had
been commonly performed in the past.” Millett, supra note 21, at 591. However, in another late 19th
century case, In Re Kemmler, the Court approved electrocution as a permissible method of execution
even though it was an uncommon practice. 136 U.S. 436, 444 (1890). “In re Kemmler seemed to suggest
that although an execution method is unusual, or uncommon, it is still constitutional if enacted by the
legislature as a more human way to administer the death penalty.” Millett, supra note 21, at 591. These
two cases demonstrate conflicting rulings in early death penalty analysis.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”); see also Millett, supra note 21, at 590–91.
27. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
28. Id. at 368 (conceding that punishment may be so disproportionate to the offense that such
punishment may be cruel and unusual). This case marked an early recognition by the Court that the
death penalty should be reserved for the worst offenses in order to maintain proportionality.
Proportionality is significant when evaluating the arbitrary imposition of death across cases.
29. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
30. Id. at 464 (“Petitioner’s suggestion is that because he once underwent the psychological strain of
electrocution, now to require him to undergo this preparation again subjects him to a lingering or cruel
and unusual punishment. Even the fact that petitioner has already been subjected to a current of
electricity does not make his subsequent execution any more cruel in the constitutional sense than any
other execution.”).
31. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
32. Id. at 101.
33. Id.

Published by Reading Room, 2017

5

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 7

844

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:3

penalty schemes throughout the United States. 34 The first
characteristic defining the death penalty was the discretion granted to
sentencing juries without any standards to ensure consistent results.35
Second, a large number of people became eligible for the death
penalty because of the large number of chargeable capital crimes.36
These facts also related to the third characteristic where the number
of people sentenced to death and numbers of people actually
executed were “remarkably small.” 37 The fourth characteristic in
many states was the limitation of appellate jurisdiction to “special
legal errors,” that did not include the “reasonableness of a death
sentence,” in any given case. 38 The fifth characteristic commonly
prevalent was a “very high proportion of nonwhite defendants
sentenced to death.” 39 Finally, the sixth characteristic dealt with
multiple points of discretion throughout the process of prosecution
that lead to the death penalty.40 The Supreme Court addressed each of
these characteristics in Furman.41

34. DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS 7–9 (1990).
35. Id. at 7–8. The level of discretion granted to juries has been found to be the root of many
constitutional issues in contemporary death penalty system face. See discussion infra Part II.C.2
(discussing jury discretionary issues in Maryland). Moreover, problems in Georgia’s death penalty
system have been directly attributed to discretion granted to juries when deciding whether or not to
impose death or life in prison. See discussion infra Part II.D.2.
36. BALDUS, supra note 34, at 7.
37. Id. at 9.
38. Id.
39. Id. This disproportionate application of death penalty laws persisted following the Furman
decision, at least in Maryland and Georgia. See discussion infra Parts II.C.2, II.D.2.
40. BALDUS, supra note 34, at 7. Similar to discretion granted to juries, the process of prosecuting a
capital case and the discretion throughout that process is directly attributed to constitutional issues in
contemporary death penalty systems. See discussion infra Parts II.C.2, II.D.2; see also infra text
accompanying note 174.
41. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 255 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 309–10
(Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 311–12 (White, J., concurring); id. at 300 (Brennan, J., concurring);
BALDUS, supra note 34, at 9, 12. Furman was not the Court’s first attempt to address these issues. See,
e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 203–20 (1971). In McGautha, California’s death penalty
was challenged because it did not provide juries with standards to impose the punishment. Id. at 185.
Ultimately, the Court held such standards were unnecessary because the states were entitled to assume
jurors would responsibly impose the sentence given its’ consequences. Id. at 208. The Court’s reasoning
was based in “a strong deference to the independent sovereignty of the states and the principles of
federalism.” BALDUS, supra note 34, at 11. McGautha was effectively overruled by Furman. Furman,
408 U.S. at 400.
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1. Furman v. Georgia
The Court in Furman issued a single paragraph per curiam opinion
invalidating the death penalty laws of Georgia and Texas. 42
Unfortunately, each Justice wrote his own concurring or dissenting
opinion, leaving little clear guidance for future courts. Three of the
Justices agreed that as applied 43 the death penalty was
unconstitutional in the United States. 44 However, two Justices
challenged the assumption of the death penalty’s constitutionality and
for the first time ruled that it is unconstitutional as cruel and unusual
punishment. 45 The four dissenting Justices relied on principles of
federalism when upholding the laws of Georgia and Texas.46
As applied, Justice Douglas found that the death penalty
impermissibly targeted poor, black Americans unequally,47 and thus,
violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.48
Justice Stewart implicitly rejected the federalism argument, finding
jury discretion without standards violated the Eighth Amendment
because there was no way to distinguish the “capriciously selected

42. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40. A per curiam opinion is defined as “[a]n opinion handed down by
an appellate court without identifying the individual judge who wrote the opinion.” Per Curiam
Opinion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Per curiam opinions are significant because they,
“by their very nature, obscure the author of an opinion.” Ira P. Robbins, Hiding Behind the Cloak of
Invisibility: The Supreme Court and Per Curiam Opinions, 86 TUL. L. REV. 1197, 1212 (2012). In
Furman v. Georgia, where there is a five-person majority, it is impossible to know which Justice’s
reasoning should apply to future cases without knowing the author of the Court’s opinion. Id.
43. As-applied challenges occur when litigants “raise a constitutional objection to a
statute . . . assert[ing] that the statute’s application to [their specific] case violates the Constitution.”
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV.
1321, 1327 (2000) (emphasis omitted). As a result, the Court may “engage in reasoning that marks the
statute as unenforceable in its totality.” Id. at 1327–28.
44. Furman, 408 U.S. at 256–57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at
314 (White, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 359–60 (Marshall, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 418 (Burger, C.J., Blackmun, J., Powell, J., Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
47. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring).
In a Nation committed to equal protection of the laws there is no permissible
‘caste’ aspect of law enforcement. Yet we know that the discretion of the judges
and juries . . . enables the penalty to be selectively applied, feeding prejudices
against the . . . poor and despised, and . . . member[s] of a suspect or unpopular
minority . . . .
Id.
48. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; BALDUS, supra note 34, at 12.
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random handful,” chosen to die from those that were not.49 Justice
White viewed the death penalty as constitutional only if it advanced
some penological purpose. 50 However, he found that the death
penalty as applied did not serve such a purpose because of three
reasons: (1) the extreme infrequency of use, (2) the alternative of
lengthy incarceration, and (3) the impossibility of determining why
some defendants were sentenced to death while others, convicted of
the same crimes, were not.51
Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall concluded the death penalty
was unconstitutional in any circumstance.52 Justice Brennan further
concluded current laws created the potential for degradation of
human dignity,53 relying on four principles to evaluate the level of
degradation the punishment created. 54 Following Justice Brennan’s
lead, Justice Marshall echoed the four principles and evaluated six
purposes the death penalty allegedly served. 55 Justice Marshall
considered: (1) retribution, (2) deterrence, (3) prevention of
recidivism, (4) encouragement of confessions and guilty pleas, (5)
eugenics, and (6) economic reasons.56 He then rejected each of these
purposes as illegitimate to retain the death penalty.57
49. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also BALDUS, supra note 34, at
12.
50. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 311–12 (White, J., concurring); see also BALDUS, supra note 34, at 12.
Such purposes include: “incapacitation, general deterrence, or . . . retribution.” Id.
51. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 311–12 (White, J., concurring); see also BALDUS, supra note 34, at 12.
Each of these three problems pointed out by Justice White arguably persist in the contemporary death
penalty system operating in Georgia. See discussion infra Part II.D.1–2.
52. Furman, 408 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 359 (Marshall, J., concurring). See also
BALDUS, supra note 34, at 12.
53. Furman, 408 U.S. at 306 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Millett, supra note 21, at 593.
54. Furman, 408 U.S. at 282 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“The test, then, will ordinarily be a
cumulative one: if a punishment is unusually severe, if there is a strong probability that it is inflicted
arbitrarily, if it is substantially rejected by contemporary society, and if there is no reason to believe that
it serves any penal purpose more effectively than some less severe punishment . . . .”).
55. Id. at 342 (Marshall, J., concurring). See also Millett, supra note 21, at 593.
56. Furman, 408 U.S. at 342 (Marshall, J., concurring). See also Millett, supra note 21, at 593–94.
57. Furman, 408 U.S. at 342–60 (Marshall, J., concurring). Marshall rejected retribution because
scholars had rejected it and “[t]he history of the Eighth Amendment supports only the conclusion that
retribution for its own sake is improper.” Id. at 342–45. He further rejected deterrence because
numerous studies had been concluded there is no deterring effect and “that capital punishment is not
necessary as a deterrent to crime in our society.” Id. at 353. Marshall rejected prevention of recidivism
because “[f]or the most part, [defendants] are first offenders, and when released from prison they are
known to become model citizens.” Id. at 355. He rejected the argument for encouragement for guilty
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A majority of the Justices did agree, however, “death-sentencing
systems operated in an essentially arbitrary and discriminatory
fashion.”58 As a result of the five concurring opinions issued by the
Justices, the Court invalidated forty-two death penalty statues as
unconstitutional,59 leaving the states with few options.
2. Post-Furman
Following Furman, seven states did not try to rewrite their
statues; 60 ten states rewrote their statutes imposing mandatory
sentences for capital crimes; 61 and twenty-five states rewrote their
statues around the issues raised in Furman.62 The statutes of the ten
states that imposed mandatory sentences were almost immediately
challenged and ruled unconstitutional in Woodson v. North
Carolina.63
On the same day of Woodson, the Court issued the plurality
opinion of Gregg v. Georgia, 64 holding “the punishment of death
does not invariably violate the Constitution.” 65 The Court then
reviewed Georgia’s new death penalty statute. 66 Under the new
Georgia law following Furman, the death penalty would only be
imposed under a bifurcated system. 67 The case would proceed
normally through a trial, and upon conviction, a separate hearing
pleas and confessions as violations of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 356. Marshall rejected eugenics
because the “[n]ation has never formally professed eugenic goals, and the history of the world does not
look kindly on them.” Id. See also Millett, supra note 21, at 594–95.
58. BALDUS, supra note 34, at 13. See also Furman, 408 U.S. at 249–57 (Douglas, J., concurring);
id. at 293–95 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 313 (White, J.,
concurring); id. at 364–66, 368 (Marshall, J., concurring).
59. Millett, supra note 21, at 592.
60. Id. at 595.
61. Id. Imposing mandatory death sentences eliminated part of the discretion opposed by Justice
Stewart in Furman. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 308–09 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also BALDUS, supra
note 34, at 22.
62. See Millett, supra note 21, at 596; see also BALDUS, supra note 34, at 32.
63. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion) (invalidating North
Carolina’s mandatory death sentence statute because it did not leave room for courts to consider
individual factors).
64. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 154 (1976) (plurality opinion).
65. Id. at 169.
66. Id. at 162–68 (reviewing Georgia’s death sentence statute).
67. Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 17-10-31(b) (1973).
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dedicated to sentencing would be conducted. 68 At this point, the
prosecution and defense would present new evidence to the jury
regarding the case’s extenuating, mitigating, and aggravating
circumstances. 69 Should the jury find an aggravating circumstance
and then choose to sentence the defendant to death, the law provides
“for a special expedited direct review by the Supreme Court of
Georgia . . . .” 70 The Supreme Court of Georgia would not only
review the case for misapplications of law, but would also evaluate
the proportionality of the sentence to the crime. 71 The Court
ultimately upheld Georgia’s new death penalty scheme.72
In the cases that followed Gregg, the Court upheld similar
statutory schemes of imposing the death penalty around the nation.73
68. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 163; see also O.C.G.A. § 17-10-31(b).
69. Id.
70. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 165. Under the statute, the jury was required to find at least one aggravating
circumstance to impose the death penalty. Id. Moreover, even if the jury found an aggravating
circumstance, the jury could still use discretion to impose the punishment. Id. This raises questions as to
whether the Georgia statute really removed the chance for unequal application of the death penalty. See
also O.C.G.A. § 17-10-35 (1973).
71. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 166–67. Generally, “[p]roportionaltiy refers to the relationship of the
punishment to the criminal conduct of the offender . . . .” William W. Berry III, Promulgating
Proportionality, 46 GA. L. REV. 69, 87–88 (2011). Proportionality reviews consider “various individual
interests,” on individualized bases in each case. Id. Moreover, proportionality reviews consider not only
if a particular crime and death sentence are proportionate, but also whether a particular defendant
received the death sentence “under circumstances that usually result in a lesser penalty.” BALDUS, supra
note 34, at 33.
72. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206–07 (“The basic concern of Furman centered on those defendants who
were being condemned to death capriciously and arbitrarily. Under the procedures before the
Court . . . [n]o longer can a jury wantonly and freakishly impose the death sentence; it is always
circumscribed by the legislative guidelines.”). Gregg was important because it was the first case
following Furman that approved of a state death penalty system. See id. at 169. The U.S. Supreme Court
approved of the Gregg procedures because it was believed they would eliminate the wanton and freakish
death sentences seen in Furman. See id. at 207. Based on studies conducted in Connecticut, Maryland,
and Georgia, the promise of Furman and Gregg is yet unrealized. See discussion infra Part II.B–D.
73. E.g., Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). The Florida statute, like Georgia’s, provided
statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances that must be considered and weighed against one
another. Id. at 250. Florida’s statute also provided for direct review by the Supreme Court of Florida;
although it did not require that court to consider proportionality. Id. at 251–52. Moreover, once the jury
considers the mitigating circumstances, it merely provides a recommendation to the judge whether or
not to impose the death penalty. Id. at 248–49. The judge has the ultimate decision on application of the
death penalty based on his or her weight of aggravating and mitigating circumstance. Id. at 249. See also
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 263 (1976). The Texas statute, like Georgia and Florida’s, provided for a
bifurcated system. Millett, supra note 21, at 598. However, Texas did not provide for a list of statutory
aggravating circumstances. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 270. Instead, Texas narrowed the list of crimes for which
death could be imposed. Id. Additionally, Texas required the jury to consider a series of question:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased
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The majority of schemes incorporated three important procedural
changes.74 First, the unitary system was replaced with a bifurcated
system.75 Second, juries would be required to consider aggravating
and mitigating circumstances in the sentencing stage. 76 In some
cases, state law prescribed only a limited number of aggravating
circumstances that a jury could consider. 77 Third, at least twenty
states created a system whereby the death sentence could be
immediately appealed to a state appeals court for review.78
Each of these reforms was directed at resolving an issue raised by
Furman, specifically the impermissible arbitrariness and
discriminatory nature of death penalty laws. 79 Although there has
been some positive effect, post-Furman statutory schemes remain
susceptible to arbitrary and discriminatory results.80 Moreover, given
the competing interests described by Justice Breyer in Glossip, the
death penalty’s value is in greater doubt than before Furman.81
II. ANALYSIS
When devising a death penalty, states must consider constitutional
limits imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court. Additionally, the Court
has required the punishment to serve some legitimate purpose. This
Part will first turn to the deterring effect of the death penalty,82 and
was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of
the deceased or another would result; (2) whether there is a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society; and (3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct
of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the
provocation, in any, by the deceased.
Id. at 269. In order to impose the death penalty, the jury must answer each question affirmatively,
otherwise a sentence of life imprisonment results. Id.
74. BALDUS ET AL, supra note 34, at 22–24.
75. Id. at 23.
76. Id. at 23–24.
77. Id. at 23.
78. Id. at 24.
79. Id. at 1–2.
80. BALDUS ET AL., supra note 34, at 2.
81. See discussion infra Part II.C.
82. See discussion infra Part II.A. For the purposes of this Note, considerations of the “penological
purposes” the death penalty serves are focused solely on deterrence. The focus is on deterrence because
history has shown deterrence to be “the top argument in favor of executions.” Michael L. Radelet &
Traci L. Lacock, Do Executions Lower Homicide Rates?: The Views of Leading Criminologists, 99
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will then consider the Constitutional concerns of arbitrariness and
discrimination.83
A. Is Deterrence a Legitimate “Penological Purpose”?
The first half of Justice Breyer’s contention in Glossip questions
whether the death penalty provides some “penological purpose[].”84
As Justice Marshall noted in Furman, the death penalty allegedly
serves several purposes. 85 He further rejected each of these
purposes, 86 and each has been rejected since Furman. 87 However,
when Nebraska recently abolished the death penalty, much debate
centered on the issue of whether or not the death penalty furthered
the goal of deterrence. 88 Instead of conducting an individualized
study on deterrence in Nebraska, critics and proponents relied on
national studies related to this issue.89

CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 492 (2009).
83. See discussion infra Part II.B–C.
84. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2772 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
85. See supra text accompanying note 56.
86. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 234–41 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
87. John L. Mackie, Retribution: A Test Case for Ethical Objectivity, in CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 98, 98 (Sanford H. Kadish et al. eds, 9th ed. 2012) (“Punitive
retribution is the repaying of harm with harm . . . . How does the criminal’s suffering or deprivation pay
anything to society? No doubt repaying a debt often hurts the person who pays it, but it does not follow
that anything that hurts someone amounts to his repaying a debt . . . . So this account is simply
incoherent . . . .”); Radelet & Lacock, supra note 82, at 489–90 (“The findings demonstrate an
overwhelming consensus . . . that the empirical research conducted on the deterrence question strongly
supports the conclusion that the death penalty does not add deterrent effects to those already achieved by
long imprisonment.”); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Cost and Capital Punishment: A New
Consideration Transforms an Old Debate, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 117, 139 (2010) (“Although there is
considerable variation today in the conduct of capital trials, it is beyond doubt that such trials are more
extensive and expensive along virtually every dimension.”). Georgia is particularly concerned with the
cost of its’ criminal justice system. GA. COUNCIL ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM, REPORT OF THE
GEORGIA COUNCIL ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 7 (2014) (discussing the results of the bipartisan,
inter-branch Special Council on Criminal Justice Reform “to improve public safety, hold offenders
accountable, and stabilize . . . spending”).
88. Compare 104 NEB. LEGIS. REC. 1, at 29 (“Most commentators who oppose capital punishment
assert that an execution has no deterrent effect . . . . Recent evidence, however, suggests . . . an
enormous deterrent effect on the number of murders.”), with id. at 37–38 (“[T]he death penalty doesn’t
work, it’s not a deterrent . . . .”).
89. Id. The scope of this Note—which is primarily concerned with issues announced in Furman—
does not require an individualized analysis of the deterrent effect of Georgia’s death penalty system. A
general discussion of deterrence will suffice to demonstrate the conflicting evidence of such an effect on
criminals.
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In 2005, Professor John J. Donohue and Assistant Professor Justin
Wolfers compiled the results of some of the most extensive studies
on death penalty deterrence.90 After evaluating the methods of each
study, Donohue and Wolfers found it difficult to correlate lower
homicide rates with greater use of the death penalty.91 They found the
true effect of the death penalty as deterrence “reasonably close to
zero.”92 The lack of clarity in empirical studies leaves room for both
sides of the debate to cite relevant statistics.
Although there is some debate, a survey conducted in 2009 by the
world’s leading criminologists found there is “an overwhelming
consensus . . . that the death penalty does not add deterrent effects to
those already achieved by long imprisonment.” 93 When asked
whether or not the death penalty acts as a general deterrent, 88.2% of
respondents said no.94 Moreover, when asked if empirical evidence
supported deterrent effects of the death penalty, 94.7% of
respondents responded the evidence showed either weak or no
support at all of deterring effects.95 Given the conflicting empirical
evidence available, it is hard to understand how some individuals cite
deterrence as a legitimate purpose to retain the death penalty. 96 It
appears the argument that capital punishment deters crime is
90. John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty
Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 804–18 (2005). The compilation included a study by Lawrence Katz,
Steven D. Levitt and Ellen Shustorovich assessing executions between 1950 and 1990. Katz et al.,
Prison Conditions, Captial Punishment, and Detterence, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 318 (2003). A second
study, conducted by Hashem Dezhbakhsh and Joanna M. Shepherd, assessed executions between 1960
and 2000. Hashem Dezhbakhsh & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment:
Evidence From a “Judicial Experiment”, http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&
context=alea (last visited Nov. 8, 2015). The final major study included by Donohue and Wolfers was
conducted by H. Naci Mocan and R. Kaj Gittings, assessing executions between 1984 and 1997. H. Naci
Mocan & R. Kaj Gittings, Getting Off Death Row: Commuted Sentences and the Deterrent Effect of
Capital Punishment, 46 J.L. & ECON. 453 (2003).
91. Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 90, at 836.
92. Id. (The zero deterrent effect means “one cannot confidently conclude that the evidence points to
either deterrent or antideterrent effects”).
93. Radelet & Lacock, supra note 82, at 489–90.
94. Id. at 501 (emphasis added).
95. Id. at app. A.
96. The survey asked several questions aimed at answering this question. The survey asked whether
the following statement was accurate or inaccurate: “Politicians support the death penalty as a symbolic
way to show they are tough on crime.” Radelet & Lacock, supra note 82, at app. A (emphasis added).
90.9% of respondents found this statement largely or totally accurate. Id.
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inconclusive at best. 97 Just as likely, the deterring argument in
support of the death penalty is flat out wrong.98 If Georgia retains the
death penalty to serve some legitimate purpose, it appears that
purpose cannot be based in the deterrence argument.
B. Does Arbitrariness Persist? Consider Connecticut.
Connecticut abolished its death penalty in 2012. 99 Instead of
looking at the deterrence factor like Nebraska, Connecticut’s
legislature chose to evaluate its death penalty by assessing levels of
arbitrariness—the second half of Justice Breyer’s contention in
Glossip.100
1. Post-Furman Death Penalty Laws
In 1973, Connecticut replaced its pre-Furman death penalty statute
with Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-46b, listing specific categories of deatheligible crimes. 101 Upon conviction of a crime falling into one of
those categories, a separate penalty phase was conducted.102 During
that phase, the trier-of-fact would decide between a sentence of death
or one of life in prison without parole.103 The statute also required the
finding of one statutory aggravating factor, 104 but the defense was
97. Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 90, at 836.
98. See Radelet & Lacock, supra note 82, at 489–90.
99. States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last modified July 1, 2015).
100. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2772 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (questioning whether or
not the system “seeks reliability and fairness,” given claims of arbitrariness in the death penalty system).
101. John J. Donohue III, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN CONNECTICUT, 1973–2007: A COMPREHENSIVE
EVALUATION FROM 4686 MURDERS TO ONE EXECUTION 67 (2013). Death eligible offenses included: (1)
the murder of a police officer, judicial marshal, firefighter, corrections officer, or other law enforcement
officer in the performance of his or her duties; (2) murder for pecuniary gain, whether defendant
committed the murder or hired someone; (3) murder by defendant with a prior conviction for either
intentional or felony murder; (4) murder by defendant under sentence of life imprisonment at time; (5)
murder by kidnapper of kidnapped person in course of kidnapping; (6) murder committed in course of
sexual assault (added 1980); (7) murder of two or more persons at the same time or in course of single
transaction (added 1980); or murder of person under sixteen years of age (added 1995). Id.
102. See also Donohue, supra note 101, at 66. The bifurcation of the death penalty was on-trend
following Gregg v. Georgia. HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE CASE AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY 2 (1992),
http://users.rcn.com/mwood/deathpen.html.
103. Donohue, supra note 101, at 66.
104. See id., at 67. The statutory aggravating factors included: (1) murder during felony by one
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allowed to present mitigating evidence.105 After trial, the Connecticut
statute provided for automatic appellate review to the Supreme Court
of Connecticut. 106 Although the statute originally required the
Supreme Court to consider whether the “sentence [was] excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,” 107 that
provision was repealed in 1998. 108 Compared to Georgia’s death
penalty laws, upheld post-Furman in Gregg v. Georgia,109 the death
penalty laws in Connecticut were remarkably similar.
2. Arbitrariness in Connecticut
Five of the Justices in Furman posited that the death penalty was
unconstitutionally arbitrary in its application. 110 When used to
challenge the death penalty in an individual case, the term arbitrary
means the case “cannot be distinguished in a ‘meaningful’ or
‘principled’ way from other cases that generally result in life
sentences or less.” 111 When the Connecticut legislature considered

previously convicted of same felony; (2) murder after two felony convictions of inflicting serious bodily
harm; (3) murder while knowingly creating a grave risk of death to others; (4) heinous, cruel, or
depraved murder; (5) murder for hire; (6) murder for pecuniary gain; (7) murder using an assault
weapon; or (8) murder of public safety official. Id.
105. Id. at 69. Statutory mitigating factors included: (1) under age of eighteen; (2) mental capacity
was impaired; (3) under unusual and substantial duress; or (4) could not reasonably have foreseen that
his conduct in the course of commission would cause, or would create a grave risk of causing, death to
another person. Id.
106. S.B. 855, 1995 Reg. Sess. (Conn. 1995).
107. Id.
108. See Donohue, supra note 101, at 69.
109. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
110. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249–57 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 293–95
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 313 (White, J., concurring); id. at
364–66, 368 (Marshall, J., concurring). See also BALDUS, supra note 34, at 13.
111. BALDUS, supra note 34, at 14. See also Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (plurality
opinion) (finding “no principled way to distinguish” the case before the Court from the many who
received lesser sentences); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 154, 206 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“If a time
comes when juries generally do not impose the death sentence in a certain kind of murder case, the
appellate review procedures assure that no defendant convicted under such circumstances will suffer a
sentence of death.”); Furman, 408 U.S. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“For, of all the people
convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners
are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been
imposed.”) (footnotes omitted); id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) (“[T]here is no meaningful basis for
distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is
not.”).

Published by Reading Room, 2017

15

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 7

854

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:3

and ultimately repealed its death penalty, much of the debate
centered on the issue of arbitrariness.112
Before abolition, Professor John J. Donohue conducted a systemic
evaluation of Connecticut’s death penalty laws. 113 Specifically,
Donohue looked to see if the “system in its entirety or in particular
aspects was operating in an arbitrary and capricious manner.” 114
Based on his research, Donohue reached three main findings
regarding arbitrariness in Connecticut’s death penalty statute.115
First, executions were “freakishly rare” in Connecticut. 116
According to the Court in Furman, evidence that a penalty is
imposed infrequently suggests its imposition is arbitrary and
therefore unconstitutional.117 Moreover, the Court rejected Georgia’s
statute that resulted in executions fifteen percent of the time in deatheligible cases. 118 Based on Donohue’s study, Connecticut imposed
the death penalty only 4.4% of time,119 far lower than the statutes at
issue in Furman.
Second, cases where the prosecutor sought death bore no
meaningful difference from cases without capital charges. 120 In
Roper v. Simmons, the U.S. Supreme Court held “[c]apital
punishment must be limited to those offenders who commit ‘a narrow
112. An Act Revising the Penalty for Capital Felonies: Hearing on SB-280 Before the Judiciary
Committee, 2012 Leg., 413th Sess. 1 (Conn. 2012) The committee reports the following as the reasons
for the bill: “Statistics show the death penalty historically is not applied in a fair and impartial
manner . . . . If even one person is sentenced to death erroneously through such an arbitrary . . . manner
open to human error, this ultimate penalty must be abolished.” Id.
113. Donohue, supra note 101, at 32.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1.
116. Id. at 4. This rate was among the lowest in the nation. Id. Only nine out of 205 death eligible
cases evaluated in Donohue’s study actually received the death penalty. Id.
117. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
118. BALDUS, supra note 34, at 80.
In Furman v. Georgia, the infrequency with which juries actually imposed death
sentences in death-eligible cases concerned each of the concurring justices. The
Furman opinions suggest that the justices estimated that the national deathsentencing rate among convicted murderers was less than 0.20. Our pre-Furman
data from Georgia indicated an unadjusted death-sentencing rate of 0.15
(44/294) . . . .
Id. (endnotes omitted). See also Furman, 408 U.S. at 386 n.11 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
119. Donohue, supra note 101, at 4.
120. Id. at 5.
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category of the most serious crimes’ and whose extreme culpability
makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.’”121 Donohue assessed
205 capital-eligible murders using two different egregiousness
measures and found no significant difference between criminals that
received the death penalty and those who did not.122
Third, Connecticut did not leave the death penalty for the worst
cases as commanded by Roper.123 Donohue found that for some cases
where death was imposed, sixty or more cases were more egregious
yet did not receive the death penalty. 124 Given the remarkable
similarities between Georgia’s current death penalty statutes and
Connecticut’s abolished version, similar challenges made in
Connecticut may reasonably be attributed to Georgia as well.
C. Does Discrimination Persist? Consider Maryland.
Five of the Justices in Furman were also concerned with
potentially inherent discrimination.125 Justice Douglas noted that the
discretionary death penalty statutes, a source of arbitrariness,126 were
also “pregnant with discrimination.” 127 After Maryland conducted
several studies, discrimination—particularly on the basis of race as a
result of discretion in the system—was of particular concern. 128
121. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319)
(holding the death penalty cannot be imposed upon juvenile offenders).
122. Donohue, supra note 101, at 5.
123. Id.; see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 568.
124. Donohue, supra note 101, at 5.
125. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“It would seem to be
incontestable that the death penalty inflicted on one defendant is ‘unusual’ if it discriminates against him
by reason of his race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that
gives room for the play of such prejudices.”) (emphasis added); id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring)
(“[A] look at the bare statistics regarding executions is enough to betray much of the discrimination . . . .
It is immediately apparent that Negroes were executed far more often than whites in proportion to their
percentage of the population. Studies indicate that while the higher rate of execution among Negroes is
partially due to a higher rate of crime, there is evidence of racial discrimination.”).
126. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 248–49 (Douglas, J., concurring). The Court previously noted the jury
may have “untrammeled discretion to let an accused live or insist that he die.” Id. at 248. But the Court
also recognized that equal protection disallowed punishment imposed through arbitrary or
discriminatory processes. Id. at 249.
127. Furman, 408 U.S. at 256–57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
128. RAYMOND PATERNOSTER & ROBERT BRAME, AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MARYLAND’S
DEATH SENTENCING SYSTEM WITH RESPECT TO THE INFLUENCE OF RACE AND LEGAL JURISDICTION 4
(2002). The study was particularly focused on the discretion at four critical points in Maryland’s capital
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Where Connecticut focused on arbitrariness, Maryland focused on
discrimination.129
1. Post-Furman Death Penalty Laws in Maryland
Following Furman, the Supreme Court of Maryland invalidated its
own death penalty laws.130 In 1975, the Maryland legislature rewrote
the statute and created eight categories of death-eligible crimes that
would result in a mandatory death sentence upon conviction. 131
However, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Woodson v. North
Carolina later invalidated all statutes imposing mandatory death
sentences.132 Maryland once again faced rewriting its death penalty
statute.133
During 1977 and 1978, Maryland crafted a third death penalty
statute.134 Under the new statute, the defendant must be convicted of
first-degree murder.135 After the conviction, the trial must move to a
penalty phase where the trier-of-fact will consider several statutory
aggravating and mitigating factors.136 The fact-finder must then find
beyond a reasonable doubt at least one aggravating circumstance
punishment system: (1) the decision of the state’s attorney to seek the death penalty, (2) the decision of
the state’s attorney not to withdraw from seeking the death penalty, (3) the decision of the state’s
attorney to take death-eligible cases to a penalty phase upon conviction, and (4) the decision of the trierof-fact to give a sentence of death. Id. at 4–5.
129. Id. at 1; Donohue, supra note 101, at 1.
130. See Bartholomey v. State, 297 A.2d 696, 701 (Md. 1972) (“We entertain not the slightest doubt
that the imposition of the death penalty under any of the presently existing discretionary statutes of
Maryland which authorize, but do not require, that penalty is unconstitutional under Furman as violative
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution. In other words, we think the net
result of the holding in Furman is that the death penalty is unconstitutional when its imposition is not
mandatory.” (footnote omitted)).
131. MD. CODE ANN., Murder § 27-413 (West 1978) (repealed in 2002); see also PATERNOSTER &
BRAME, supra note 128, at 7.
132. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also
PATERNOSTER & BRAME, supra note 128, at 7.
133. Blackwell v. State, 365 A.2d 545, 549 (Md. 1976) (“The [Maryland death penalty] statute does
not provide any other standards whereby the sentencing authority can consider the individual
circumstances or characteristics of either the offense or the offender; indeed, all those convicted under
the statute are treated alike . . . . In view of these deficiencies, the Attorney General reasons that the
death penalty provisions . . . are unconstitutional, and we fully agree.”); see also PATERNOSTER &
BRAME, supra note 128, at 7.
134. PATERNOSTER & BRAME, supra note 128, at 7.
135. MD. CODE ANN., Murder § 27-413 (West 1978) (repealed in 2002).
136. Id.
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before death may be imposed. 137 If death is imposed, the case is
subject to automatic appellate review by the Maryland Court of
Appeals.138 Maryland’s death penalty was remarkably similar to the
system enacted in Georgia post-Furman.
2. Discrimination in Maryland
Since 1978, several studies have been conducted in Maryland to
investigate racial discrimination.139 Professors Raymond Paternoster
and Robert Brame conducted the most recent study, in which the pair
focused on filling the gaps of previous studies with additional
information. 140 Additionally, Paternoster and Brame evaluated the
discretionary stages of a capital case in Maryland in hopes of finding
the source of potential racial discrimination.141
After examining approximately 6,000 murder cases,142 Paternoster
and Brame concluded that race did in fact affect the outcome of death
penalty cases in Maryland.143 Unlike previous reports, this case study
accounted for 123 explanatory factors or case characteristics in order
to accurately determine whether race and discretion affected capital
cases. 144 After accounting for these variables, the study concluded
that race of the victim significantly affected whether courts imposed
the death penalty.145 Paternoster and Brame found that prosecutors
sought the death penalty 1.6 times more often in cases where the
137. Id.
138. Id.; see also PATERNOSTER & BRAME, supra note 128, at 11.
139. PATERNOSTER & BRAME, supra note 128, at 1.
140. See id. at 3. In a previous study, the authors of that study pointed out two central limitations on
their study: “(1) their sample did not include all possible death eligible cases, and (2) they had limited
information on the non-statutory aggravating and mitigating factors in the case and other case
characteristics.” Id. at 3–4.
141. Id. at 4–5. See note 128 and accompanying text.
142. Id. at 12. The report was based upon an examination of approximately 6,000 first and second
degree murders that were committed in the state of Maryland from August of 1978 until September of
1999. Id. The study started in 1978 because that was the year the new death penalty law took effect.
PATERNOSTER & BRAME, supra note 128, at 12.
143. Id. at 32–37.
144. Id. at 19. The final report of the study included Table 9, which listed all case characteristics the
study considered. Id. at tbl. 9. Some examples of case characteristics include whether the defendant had
prior convictions, it was a multiple victim case, the defendant had history of abuse, the victim was
mutilated, the victim was killed execution style, the victim was pregnant, etc. Id.
145. Id. at 33.
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victim was white than when the victim was black.146 Moreover, the
probability of actually receiving a death sentence is two times higher
in a white-victim case than in a non-white-victim case.147
The study was equally disparaging when considering racial
makeup in the combination of offender and victim. When Paternoster
and Brame considered the racial makeup of the offender and victim
in tandem, they concluded that “black offenders who slay white
victims are more likely to be sentenced to death than other racial
combinations . . . .”148 In fact, prosecutors are twice as likely to seek
the death penalty in black-on-white cases than black-on-black
cases, 149 and 1.7 times more likely than in white-on-white
cases. 150 The study suggests that even when considering 123
additional factors, these racial disparities “cannot be
explained . . . .”151 Paternoster and Brame note that these disparities
develop at the early stages of a capital case where prosecutors
possess the most discretion,152 which may in itself suggest a causal
source.
D. Georgia’s Death Penalty
Deterrence is universally a suspect excuse to retain the death
penalty. 153 Moreover, arbitrariness and discrimination existed in
death penalty systems remarkably similar to Georgia’s current capital
punishment law.154 This suggests that Georgia’s system may also be
arbitrarily and discriminatorily defective. An extensive study
examined whether Georgia’s system does in fact exhibit those
unconstitutional qualities.

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

PATERNOSTER & BRAME, supra note 128, at 34.
Id.
Id. at 35–36.
Id. at 36.
Id.
Id. at 32.
PATERNOSTER & BRAME, supra note 128, at 41.
See discussion supra Part II.A.
See discussion supra Part II.B–C.
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1. Arbitrariness in Georgia
David C. Baldus organized a study (Baldus study) in which he
gathered statistics and used them to try to determine whether courts
arbitrarily imposed the death penalty on murder convicts. 155 The
authors reached four conclusions. First, the post-Furman reforms to
Georgia’s death penalty statute did in fact result in increased
consistency among murder cases that received the death sentence.156
Excessive sentences dropped from 43% pre-Furman to 13% postFurman. 157 This meant that the death penalty was applied more
selectively. 158 However, this change was the extent of positive
improvement following Furman.
The second finding showed the number of death sentences
imposed was substantially lower than that authorized by Georgia
law. 159 This poses a problem because the Justices in Furman
suggested that infrequency of death sentences tended to prove the
penalty was arbitrary.160 Third, Georgia’s statutory requirement of an
aggravating circumstance to impose the death penalty did “not serve
155. BALDUS, supra note 34, at 98.
156. Id. at 97. This study was conducted with an eye toward comparing pre-Furman and post-Furman
changes in arbitrariness and discrimination in Georgia, and is thus more illustrative of the thesis of this
Note: the promise of Furman remains unfulfilled. Id. at 98. However, recent studies reached similar
conclusions as the Baldus study. See Raymond Paternoster et al., Race and Death Sentencing in
Georgia, 1989-1998, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN
STATE DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS: THE GEORGIA DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT app., at S–T
(2006) (reaching similar findings “consistent with many other post-Furman studies,” regarding the death
penalty in Georgia).
157. BALDUS, supra note 34, at 92. The authors state that excessiveness is the “central defect of
arbitrary death sentences.” Id. at 14. The death sentence, according to the authors, is excessive “if it is so
infrequently imposed among a group of similarly situated capital defendants that it offends basic notions
of evenhandedness and comparative justice.” Id.
158. BALDUS, supra note 34, at 92.
159. Id. at 97.
160. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309–10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I simply conclude
that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under
legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.”); id. at 311,
313 (White, J., concurring) (“I begin with what I consider a near truism: that the death penalty could so
seldom be imposed that it would cease to be a credible deterrent or measurably to contribute to any other
end of punishment . . . . But however that may be, I cannot avoid the conclusion that as the statutes
before us now administered, the penalty is so infrequently imposed that the threat of execution is too
attenuated to be of substantial service to criminal justice.”); see also BALDUS, supra note 34, at 80 (“In
Furman v. Georgia, the infrequency with which juries actually imposed death sentences in deatheligible cases concerned each of the concurring justices.”).
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in practice to distinguish murder cases in which death sentences are
routinely imposed from those that normally result in a life
sentence.”161 Both findings posed a problem because they are both
directly contrary to the Supreme Court’s expectations expressed in
Gregg.162
Finally, the study found that prosecutors and juries did not reserve
the death penalty for the most severe cases.163 In fact, 15%–30% of
death sentences appeared to be excessive as defined by the study.164
Moreover, nearly one-half of Georgia’s death sentences post-Furman
showed some evidence of excessiveness. 165 This information
provides strong evidence that Georgia’s death penalty statute still
produces arbitrary results contrary to Furman.
2. Discrimination in Georgia
The Baldus study also questioned whether race determined if a
defendant received the death penalty.166 Much like the results of the
Maryland study,167 the Baldus study found that the defendant’s race
did not have much impact on whether the death penalty was
imposed.168 However, when the study examined effects with varying
races of the victim, the results showed a victim’s race remained

161. BALDUS, supra note 34, at 97.
162. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 154, 154 (1976) (plurality opinion). “The basic concern of Furman
centered on those defendants who were being condemned to death capriciously and arbitrarily. Under
the procedures before the Court . . . [n]o longer can a jury wantonly and freakishly impose the death
sentence; it is always circumscribed by the legislative guidelines.” Id. at 206–07; see also BALDUS,
supra note 34, at 97.
163. BALDUS, supra note 34, at 97–98.
164. Id. at 98. See note 157 and accompany text for definition of “excessive.”
165. BALDUS, supra note 34, at 98.
166. See id. at 32.
167. See discussion supra Part II.C.
168. BALDUS, supra note 34, at 149.
[A]t each point . . . the predicted likelihood of a death sentence is lower for blackdefendant/white-victim cases than it is for the white-defendant/white-victim
cases. However . . . a race-of-defendant effect reemerges when one examines
separately the cases from urban rural areas. The rural cases suggest black
defendants were still at a slight disadvantage, although the effect is not
statistically significant. In urban Georgia, we find a statistically significant raceof-defendant effect that disadvantaged white defendants.
Id. at 150 (endnote omitted).
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significant. 169 In fact, in all cases where the victim was white the
study found a 27% likelihood the death sentence would be
imposed, 170 compared to only a 7% chance when the victim was
black. 171 This meant the death penalty was sought 3.9 times more
often in white-victim cases than in black-victim cases.172
The Baldus study concluded that these clearly discriminatory
results originated at two points of discretion: the prosecutor’s
decision to seek or waive the death penalty following trial and the
jury’s decision to impose a life sentence or death.173 At each stage,
the study found that race was a factor for both the prosecutor and
jury. 174 Significantly, in all cases where the victim was white, the
prosecutor and jury were more likely to seek and impose the death
penalty when the defendant was black instead of white.175 In addition
to the arbitrary results previously discussed,176 the statistics provided
in the Baldus study tend to prove a clear racial bias in Georgia when
the death penalty is sought and imposed.
III. PROPOSAL
In Glossip, Justice Breyer reiterated Supreme Court precedent,
which found “the finality of death creates a ‘qualitative difference’
between the death penalty and other punishments.” 177 Therefore,
there is “a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific
case.” 178 However, the corresponding procedural safeguards
necessary to ensure reliability “lead to a . . . constitutional problem:
169. Id.
170. Id. at tbl. 32.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. BALDUS, supra note 34, at 161.
174. See id. When the data is not adjusted for case culpability, the data show effects of race in
prosecutorial and jury discretion. Id. However, the adjusted data show race remains significant. Id. at
tbls. 38–41.
175. See id. at tbls. 38–39.
176. See discussion supra Part II.D.1.
177. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2756 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
178. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (emphasis added).
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excessively long periods of time that individuals typically spend on
death row, alive but under sentence of death.”179
Traditionally, the death penalty allegedly served three purposes:
deterrence, retribution, or incapacitation.180 Justice Breyer finds the
argument in favor of deterrence unpersuasive, relying on studies that
provide conflicting results regarding the general deterrent effect of
the death penalty. 181 Similarly, Justice Breyer questions the
retribution value of a significantly delayed execution.182 He finds the
relevant question is whether retribution is really served when finality
only comes decades later, if ever.183 Just as he finds life in prison
without parole a suitable substitute to achieve incapacitation, that
punishment is also sufficient to serve the purpose of retribution.184
Justice Breyer concludes that a procedurally fair and reliable death
penalty undermines the purpose for using the punishment at all,185
but if the death penalty was structured to minimize delay the courts
could not ensure it was imposed reliably.186
The task of creating a death penalty system that provides both a
“penological purpose” and simultaneously seeks “reliability and
fairness” in its application is a daunting, if not an impossible task.187
It is clear contemporary death penalty systems raise severe
179. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2764 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Finding the length of delay to have increased
significantly over the years, Justice Breyer concluded such delay caused serious constitutional concerns.
Id. Significantly, “delays undermine the death penalty’s penological rationale,” which traditionally
“rests upon society’s need to secure deterrence, incapacitation, [or] retribution . . . .” Id. at 2767.
Incapacitation is served just as well by sentencing a defendant to life in prison without parole. Id. Justice
Breyer notes that rehabilitation is also a classical rationale for punishment, but capital punishment by
definition does not rehabilitate. Id.
180. Id.
181. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2767–68; see also discussion supra Part II.A.
182. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2769.
183. Id. (citing Valle v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
184. Id. The value of retribution is based on an individual’s personal opinion. Id. Even still, there is
debate as to whether retribution is a valid reason to punish. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
Unlike retribution, deterrence is not a policy question that is debatable; either a deterrent effect exists or
it does not. Millett, supra note 21, at 597.
185. Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2772. “[D]elay is in part a problem that the Constitution’s own demands
create.” Id. at 2764.
186. Id. “A death penalty system that is unreliable or procedurally unfair would violate the Eight
Amendment. And so would a system that, if reliable and fair in its application of the death penalty,
would serve no legitimate penological purpose.” Id. at 2772.
187. Id. at 2772 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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constitutional concerns regarding arbitrariness and discrimination.188
Thus, it is imperative that Georgia takes some action to guarantee
justice for criminal defendants and provide value in the application of
criminal punishment. There are two potential avenues for Georgia to
pursue: abolition or reform.
A. Abolition
Abolition of the death penalty remains a clear and simple solution
to all the problems posed by retention and implementation of the
punishment. The death penalty provides no real penological
purpose. 189 Instead, the system provides only arbitrary and
discriminatory results.190 Moreover, the difficulty of resolving those
flaws while balancing the need to retain a legitimate purpose, as
previously noted, is near impossible.191 Additionally, retention of the
death penalty in itself—setting aside the need for essential reforms—
is more costly than abolition.192
Although the problems of retention and benefits of abolition are
readily apparent, the political realities in the United States and
Georgia make abolition an unlikely solution to the problems posed by
the current death penalty scheme.193 In a recent poll conducted by
Gallup, 61% of Americans favor the death penalty for a person
convicted of murder while only 37% disfavor it.194 Although this is
the highest level of disapproval since March of 1972, 195 a strong
majority clearly supports the death penalty nationally. Given this
political reality, Georgia legislators will most likely forgo this option
188. See discussion supra Parts II.B–D; Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2776 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
189. See supra Parts II.A, III.
190. See supra Part II.B–D.
191. See supra Parts III.A.1–2.
192. Steiker, supra note 87, at 139 (“Although there is considerable variation today in the conduct of
capital trials, it is beyond doubt that such trials are more extensive and expensive along virtually every
dimension.”).
193. Russell D. Covey, Death in Prison: The Right Death Penalty Compromise, 28 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1085, 1121–22 (2012) (“The largest obstacle to abolition of the death penalty . . . is its continuing
political popularity, no doubt fueled in large part by the widely shared belief that murderers deserve
‘death,’ not ‘life.’”).
194. Death Penalty, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty.aspx (last visited Dec.
16, 2015).
195. Id.
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to eliminate the threats posed by the current death penalty scheme.
Therefore, legislators may only work to diminish the ill effects in the
system through reform by fighting the competing interests cited by
Justice Breyer in Glossip.
B. Reform the Current System
Issues related to the death penalty are attributed to the great
discretion granted to prosecutors and juries. 196 Therefore, reforms
should be aimed at meaningful limitations of discretion without
conflicting with Supreme Court precedent.
1. Limiting Jury Discretion
Georgia’s contemporary death penalty statute was largely upheld
because the Supreme Court found sufficient procedural safeguards—
relying primarily on statutorily defined aggravating factors—to
eliminate the arbitrary or discriminatory imposition of the death
penalty by the jury.197 Based on the Baldus study, however, it is clear
that the statutory aggravating factors have not carried the weight
envisioned by the Gregg court.198
First, it may be “impossible to construct a verbal formula that
would permit different juries to make reasonably consistent
comparative judgments about the relative blameworthiness of
different defendants, much less to decide in any consistent fashion
which of those defendants should live and which of them should
die.” 199 Meaningful reform aimed at eliminating arbitrary or
196. PATERNOSTER & BRAME, supra note 128, at 4–5.
197. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 154, 206–07 (plurality opinion) (“The new Georgia sentencing
procedures . . . focus the jury’s attention on the particularized nature of the crime and the particularized
characteristics of the individual defendant. While the jury is permitted to consider any aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, it must find and identify at least one statutory aggravating factor before it may
impose a penalty of death. In this way the jury’s discretion is channeled. No longer can a jury wantonly
and freakishly impose the death sentence; it is always circumscribed by the legislative guidelines.”).
Specifically, the addition of statutory aggravating factors would give greater guidance to prosecutors
and juries. See BALDUS, supra note 34, at 409.
198. BALDUS, supra note 34, at 410 (“[T]he statutory aggravating factors do not appear to ‘guide’ in
any meaningful way either the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in deciding when to seek a death
sentence or the exercise of jury sentencing discretion.”).
199. Id.
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discriminatory results, by minimizing jury discretion, runs the risk of
running afoul the Supreme Court’s prohibition against mandatory
death sentences in Woodson v. North Carolina.200
Second, if it is possible to create a formula for the jury to follow,
the current laws fail to achieve any real limits on discretion.
Although Georgia law provides a list of statutory aggravating factors,
it also allows the jury to consider “any . . . circumstances otherwise
authorized by law . . . .”201 As a result, statutory aggravating factors
are unable to “impose any degree of regularity upon sentencing
decisions . . . .” 202 The results of the Baldus study bear out these
results, finding statutory aggravating factors only “exert . . . a modest
influence on the actual sentencing results.”203
2. Limiting Prosecutorial Discretion
Similar to juries, statutorily defined aggravating factors have failed
to limit cases in which prosecutors choose to pursue the death
penalty.204 Recently, the American Bar Association’s Death Penalty
Moratorium Implementation Project (the Project) conducted an
assessment of Georgia’s death penalty system.205 At the outset, the
Project acknowledged that “[t]he character, quality, and efficiency of
the whole system is shaped in great measure by the manner in which
the prosecutor exercises his or her broad discretionary powers.” 206
Although the Project makes several recommendations to improve the
quality of prosecutions, there were no recommendations designed to
directly limit prosecutorial discretion. 207 Reforms should make an
200. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (plurality opinion) (invalidating mandatory death
sentence statute because it did not leave room for courts to consider individual factors). “[U]nless we
return to the mandatory death penalty struck down in Woodson, the constitutionality of capital
punishment rests on its limited application to the worst of the worst. And this extensive body of
evidence suggests that is not so limited.” Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2762 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
201. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b) (2015).
202. BALDUS, supra note 34, at 410.
203. Id. at 411.
204. See supra text accompanying note 198.
205. AM. BAR ASS’N, EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN STATE DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS:
THE GEORGIA DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT i (2006).
206. Id. at 109.
207. Id. at 122–30. The Project recommended that Georgia: (1) establish written policies and
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attempt to directly address the broad discretion granted to
prosecutors.
3. Solution
The Supreme Court requires current schemes to strike a balance
between granting prosecutors and juries discretion and enough
guidance to reach consistent and proportionate results between cases.
Attempts to even curtail, but not entirely remove, their discretion
have been struck down.208 I suggest two reforms to the system.
For the first reform, give the trial judge the authority to impose the
death penalty and take the question away from the jury entirely.
Importantly, the jury would still be required to explicitly find
aggravating and mitigating factors, but the judge would be the sole
arbiter of those facts. This will allow the judge to decide, as a matter
of law and on balance of all relevant circumstances, whether a
defendant should be sentenced to death. Judges are better situated to
review the case and decide whether the punishment is proportionate
to sentences imposed for similarly situated defendants and crimes.
Allowing the trial judge to perform a proportionality review, rather
than waiting for the Supreme Court of Georgia to do so when the
convicted defendant inevitably appeals, will help eliminate both
arbitrary and discriminatory applications of the death penalty at an
earlier stage. Additionally, allowing the judge to decide may expedite
the process. Juries perform well when asked to determine issues of
fact in a single case. However, they are totally incapable of
comparing results in their own case to the results of another. The
Supreme Court upheld a similar reform in Proffitt v. Florida.209
guidelines for imposing the death penalty; (2) establish policies in state laboratories for the handling of
evidence; and (3) provide funding for training and continuing education of all state prosecutors. Id. The
State of Georgia is in compliance with some of these recommendations, but the Project could not make
an accurate determination in some cases because Georgia’s records are not complete. Id.
208. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (plurality opinion). The U.S. Supreme Court
invalidated North Carolina’s death penalty statute because it did not give juries the opportunity to
consider all aggravating and mitigating circumstances when determining whether or not to impose the
death penalty. Millett, supra note 21, at 596.
209. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 260. The Florida statute, like Georgia’s, provides statutory
aggravating and mitigating circumstances that must be considered and weighed against one another by
the jury. Id. at 250. However, the judge has the ultimate decision on application of the death penalty
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An alternative would allow juries to make a recommendation to
the trial judge, but only after the jury has been presented with
additional evidence. Presenting the jury with evidence from the
sentencing stages of other cases similar to the present case allows the
jury to review their own decision for proportionality. This would give
the jury more information to make a recommendation, with
proportionality as a factor, and would work to help resolve some of
the problems. 210 This alternative, however, would almost certainly
lengthen the trial process and would not help promote a purpose of
the death penalty due to the extra delay. Therefore, this alternative
should only be considered if the legislators are concerned the first
option would be challenged in the courts and ultimately ruled
unconstitutional.
For the second reform, the trial judge should have the opportunity
to review the case for aggravating and mitigating circumstances in a
pretrial hearing. For the purposes of the hearing, the judge will ask: if
the defendant is found guilty and a jury finds the necessary facts,
would I impose the death penalty? This second reform will provide a
much needed check on prosecutorial discretion because the judge
will be able to decide at the outset whether he or she will allow the
based on his or her weight of aggravating and mitigating circumstance and is free to take or decline the
jury recommendation. Id. at 249. Florida’s statute was recently ruled unconstitutional. Hurst v. Florida,
136 S. Ct. 616, 619 (2016). However, the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling was based on the fact that juries
in Florida would provide recommendations on unspecified factual findings. Id. at 622. As a result, the
judge was sentencing defendants to death on the judge’s own findings and the jury’s role was
superfluous. Id. To respond to this challenge, Georgia legislators could reform the system to prohibit the
jury from providing a recommendation at all, and instead require very detailed factual findings on
aggravating and mitigating circumstances from the jury. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 612 (2002)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“Those States that leave the ultimate life-or-death decision to the judge
may . . . do so—by requiring a prior jury finding of aggravating factor in the sentence phase . . . .”). The
trial judge would then only be allowed to sentence the defendant based on those explicit factual findings
by the jury. This reform would still allow for the benefit of limiting jury discretion while remaining
within Constitutional bounds.
210. BALDUS, supra note 34, at 8–9 (discussing issues related to jury discretion). The death penalty is
a punishment that requires both subjective and objective application. Subjectively, the jury must ask: on
all the facts of this case, does this person deserve to be executed? But that decision must be objectively
appropriate when compared to all the other capital crimes where the death penalty is both imposed and
not imposed. Juries are limited to evidence of the present trial in order to determine guilt or innocence
and life or death, and are therefore unable to adequately judge the objective application of death in any
particular case. Short of taking the question from the jury entirely, the next best option is to give the
necessary information to the jury in order for it to make a constitutionally sound decision.
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death penalty to be imposed. Once again, the judge will be allowed to
conduct a proportionality review and will be able to decide as a
matter of law if the circumstances warrant the death penalty, but will
be able to do so at the outset of trial. Moreover, this reform will
potentially help reduce time and costs of trying a capital crime where
the death penalty would not otherwise be imposed. Although trial
judges in practice may give deference to the prosecutor, the reform
will at least provide judges a tool to check the prosecutor’s broad
discretion. Together, these reforms strike a balance of improving the
current system on efficiency while ensuring that criminal defendants
are protected from arbitrary and discriminatory results.
CONCLUSION
In the past three years, Nebraska, Connecticut, and Maryland have
abolished the death penalty. Although they did so for different
reasons, each state ultimately decided the total cost—both
procedurally and financially—was greater than the value the death
penalty provides. The problems these states exhibit clearly
demonstrate the tension recognized by Justice Breyer in Glossip. The
need to have a fair and reliable death penalty invariably conflicts
with the state’s ability to craft a system that simultaneously serves
some legitimate purpose.
Since Furman, several states have attempted to craft such a
system, but it is evident based on recent studies that the promise of
Furman has not been achieved. Respectively, Nebraska, Connecticut,
and Maryland chose to abolish the death penalty because it does not
deter capital crime, is arbitrary in application, and is demonstrably
discriminatory. The flaws of these systems, which are based on
Georgia’s death penalty approved in Gregg, are directly attributable
to Georgia as well. Abolition is the best option for Georgia
legislators, but is highly unlikely given the political pressure to retain
the death penalty. In lieu of abolition, meaningful reform may be
possible to achieve while also protecting purpose and reliability.
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